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A RETROSPECTIVE ON LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL
COUNCIL: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
21 CENTURY
Dana Beach* & Kim Diana Connolly**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that David Lucas'
two beachfront lots on the northern end of the Isle of Palms had been
"taken" by the State of South Carolina.' Twelve years later, as the nation
moves forward into the 2 1st century with booming coastal development
and rising sea levels,2 certain fundamental issues that underlie the Lucas
debate3 soon will resurface and require resolution. The following
reflection on Lucas is meant to help enlighten decision-makers as they
confront the inevitable beachfront and land use challenges of the, coming
decades.
This retrospective begins by providing a brief overview of the laws
governing takings, including the Lucas decision, as well as an analysis of
the outcomes of the decision. It then examines the economic and geologic
contexts of the Lucas case and the response (or lack thereof) of the U.S.
Supreme Court to these factors. In addition, this retrospective briefly
summarizes the origins of the constitutional protection of property and the
Court's applications of these principles to Lucas. The paper concludes by
pointing out the power of public subsidies to distort the free market and
the regulatory process, and the urgent need for state legislatures, not
courts, to resolve this radical divergence of public fiscal policy and
government regulation.
Executive Director and Founder of the South Carolina Coastal Conservation
League. MBA 1979, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, previously Special
Assistant for Environmental Affairs to U.S. Congressman Arthur Ravenel, Jr. The author
can be reached at DanaBeach@scccl.org.
"" Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; Director,
Environmental Law Clinic; Associate Faculty, University of South Carolina School of the
Environment. J.D. 1993, Georgetown University Law Center. The author can be reached
at connolly@law.sc.edu. The authors express their appreciation to Nancy Vinson, Ashley
McMahan, and Michelle Melton for their assistance with the research and editing of this
article.
'Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND OVERVIEW
OF THE LUCAS DECISION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (through
the "Takings Clause") prevents the government from taking private land
for public use without providing just compensation. The Fourteenth
Amendment makes the prohibition applicable to states.5  The Takings
Clause thus acts as a restraint on government authority to appropriate and
regulate private property, and protects individual liberty from
inappropriate governmental intrusions.6  Although the language of the
Takings Clause appears clear and simple, applying its language has proven
to be extremely troublesome for the U.S. Supreme Court.
4 U.S. Const. amend. V. ("nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.")
5 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. ("nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
6 See generally Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698
(1999) (holding that government authorities may not burden property owners with
imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1985) (holding that
final decisions as to whether a property owner may develop the property should not occur
until the responsible agency determines the extent of permitted development on the land);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding that where a
regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically
beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex number
of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to
which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action).
7 See Hope M. Babcock, Has the US. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of
Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1995). For other
observations of the Court's difficulties in Lucas and beyond, see Stephen E. Abraham,
Windfalls or Windmills: The Right of a Property Owner to Challenge Land Use
Regulations (A Call to Critically Reexamine the Meaning of Lucas), 13 J. Land Use &
Envtl. Law 161 (1997) (analyzing the state of property law after Lucas and Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825 (1987)); Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild Things Are?, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 849
(2000) (suggesting that Lucas was a failure as an attempt by the Court to simplify "the
judicial task of resolving... land use disputes"); Katherine A. Bayne, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: Drawing a Line in the Sand, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1063 (1993)
(concluding that Lucas is consistent with the Fifth Amendment); Bruce W. Burton, Post-
Lucas Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court's Riddle of the R.I.B.E.: Where No
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Mind Has Gone Before, 25 U. Tol. L. Rev. 155 (1994) (illustrating how regulations can
constitute a taking with regard to reasonable investment-backed expectations); David L.
Callies, After Lucas: Land Use Regulation and the Taking of Property Without
Compensation, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 506 (1993) (a collection of essays outlining the
fundamental issues raised by Lucas); Jennifer L. Chapman, Navigable Purpose? Prove it.
Rethinking the Role of the Navigational Servitude in Regulatory Takings Claims After
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1195 (2001) (outlining the
effects of Lucas on the traditional takings analysis and the potential effect on takings
claims involving navigational servitudes); John H. Davidson & Martin Weeks, Jr.,
Drainage in South Dakota: Wetlands, Lucas, Watersheds, and the 1985 Drainage
Legislation, 42 S.D. L. Rev. 11 (1997) (reconciling drainage laws with the Lucas
holding); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 955 (1993) (dissecting
the arguments against the Court's effort to reinvigorate the Takings Clause); John M.
Groen & Richard M. Stephens, Takings Law, Lucas, and the Growth Management Act,
16 Puget Sound L. Rev. 1260 (1993) (identifying, in light of Lucas, potential trouble
sports in the Washington State Growth Management Act of 1990); F. Patrick Hubbard,
Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc
Balancing, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 465 (2001) (contrasting the symbolic and managerial
perspective on Supreme Court regulatory takings opinion); Brian D. Lee, Fifth
Amendment - Regulatory Takings Depriving All Economically Viable Use of a Property
Owner's Land Require Just Compensation Unless the Government Can Identify Common
Law Nuisance Or Property Principles Furthered by the Regulation - Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1840 (1993)
(asserting that Fifth Amendment analysis has resulted in one of the most muddled areas
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence); Laura McKnight, Regulatory Takings: Sorting
Out Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 41 Kan. L.
Rev. 615 (1993) (identifying an implied but critical distinction in the two-step analysis
for understanding regulatory takings); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and
Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 301 (1993) (discussing takings jurisprudence in light of judicial conservatism);
Jamie Mueller, Developments in Case Law: South Carolina Supreme Court Finds That a
Lucas "Taking" Also Applies to Personal Property, 4 S.C. Envtl. L.J. 198 (1995)
(analyzing a case in which the court applied the Lucas test where the value of a
development permit was reduced by a land management ordinance that restricted land
use); Paula C. Murray, Private Takings of Endangered Species as Public Nuisance:
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and the Endangered Species Act, 12 UCLA J.
Envtl. L. & Policy 119 (1993) (stating that "the takings jurisprudence prior to Lucas [and
arguably post-Lucas] is, at a minimum, confusing and, at most, incomprehensible");
Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scalia's
Primer on Property Rights: Advancing New Democratic Traditions by Defending the
Tradition of Property, 24 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 161 (2000) (proposing
that the Court's changing definitions of Fifth Amendment property have confused
litigants); Jamee Jordan Patterson, California Land Use Regulation Post Lucas: The
History and Evolution of Nuisance and Public Property Laws Portend Little Impact in
California, 11 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Policy 175 (1993) (contending that takings
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Furthermore, states such as South Carolina have similar state law
takings provisions,8 typically in their state constitutions.
9
The Lucas case originated with the 1986 purchase by David H.
Lucas of two residential lots in the Wild Dune development on the Isle of
Palms, a barrier island to the east of Charleston, South Carolina.' 0 A
contractor, manager, and part owner of the development, Lucas had lived
in the area for eight years." The lots were on land known to be unstable
and subject to daily floods and a shifting shoreline - so much so, that for
"roughly half of the last 40 years, all or part of [the] property was part of
the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide.' 2
Specifically, between 1957 and 1963, the property was under water. 13
The following decade, the shoreline was 100 to 150 feet onto Lucas'
jurisprudence has become "more complicated and confused than ever" since 1987); Paul
Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on
Takings Analysis, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 537 (1994) (looking at takings jurisprudence in light
of the fact that the majority of remaining U.S. wetlands is under private ownership);
Joseph L. Sax, Rights That "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas Case on
Western Water Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 943 (1993)(questioning whether water rights
inhere in the title of a property owner after Lucas); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in
Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury
Signifying Nothing, 12 Va. Envtl. L.J. 439 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas has had very
little practical effect on regulation of real property); Victoria Sutton, Constitutional
Taking Doctrine - Did Lucas Really Make a Difference?, 18 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 505
(2001) (examining the impact of Lucas on private property rights); Russell Traw,
Developments in Case Law: The Authority of the South Carolina Coastal Council, 4 S.C.
Envtl. L.J. 201 (1995); James B. Wadley, Lucas and Environmental Land Use Controls
in Rural Areas: Whose Land Is It Anyway?, 19 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 331 (1993)
(implying not only that Lucas created confusion, but also that it was too broad); Robert
M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 52 Md. L. Rev. 162 (1993) (examining the breadth of the fundamental,
constitutional right to be secure in the use of one's own property).
8 The South Carolina Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken.
for public use without just compensation being first made therefor." S.C. Const. art. 1,
§ 13. See also National Conference of State Legislatures, Evaluating the Effects of State
Takings Legislation, State Legislative Report, <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/esnr/
slr232.htm> (accessed Oct. 30, 2003).
9 For an excellent discussion of the South Carolina takings jurisprudence and its
implications, see F. Patrick Hubbard, "Takings Reform " and the Process of State
Legislative Change in the Context of a "National Movement," 50 S.C. L. Rev. 93 (1998).
'0 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006. Lucas paid $975,000 for the two lots. Id.




property. 14  The instability of the land in the Wild Dune development
prompted the Town of Isle of Palms to issue twelve emergency orders for
sandbagging to protect existing structures between 1981 and 1982 alone.
The South Carolina Coastal Council subsequently issued permits for two
rock revetments 15 to be placed close to Lucas' property.' 6 In fact, one of
the revetments extends more than halfway onto one of the Lucas lots.17
In 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act (BMA),' 8 which amended and strengthened South
Carolina's 1977 Coastal Zone Management Act.' 9 The retreat provision
of the Beachfront Management Act, designed to prevent construction in
such erosional areas, stopped Lucas from building any permanent
buildings on his lots.20 Lucas filed suit against the South Carolina Coastal
Council, the state agency responsible for implementing the Beachfront
Management Act, alleging that his property had been taken without just
compensation. 21 Specifically, Lucas claimed the Act deprived him of all
14 id.
15 Revetments are "structures placed on banks or bluffs in such a way as to absorb
the energy of incoming waves. They are usually built to preserve the existing uses of the
shoreline and to protect the slope. Like seawalls, revetments armor and protect the land
behind them. They may be either watertight, covering the slope completely, or porous, to
allow water to filter through after the wave energy has been dissipated."
<http://www.usna.edu/NAOE/courses/en420/bonnette/revetments.html> (last visited Jan.
10, 2004).
16Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038.
17 id.
'8 S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Supp. 2002). The Beachfront
Management Act created baselines, taking into account erosion levels from year to year,
from which setbacks were created where development could begin. See South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control, The South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act, Preface, <http://www.scdhec.net/eqc/ocrm/pubs/uoce.pdf> (accessed
Jan. 30, 2004).
19 S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10 - 48-39-360 (1987). This state law was passed in
accordance with the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-
1465 (2000). The state Coastal Zone Management Act was amended further in 1990. See
1990 S.C. Acts 607.
20 The Act prohibited building seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward to, and
parallel to, a "baseline" connecting the landwardmost "points of erosion ... during the
past forty years." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-1009 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-
280(A)(2)).
21 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
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"economically viable use" of his property, and was therefore an
uncompensated taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
22
The state trial court agreed with Lucas, finding that the ban on
building rendered his lots "valueless" and entering an award for $1.2
million.23 In 1991, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, noting the
Legislature's findings that new construction in a coastal zone threatened a
public resource.24 Citing the 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas,25 the South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled that when a regulation is designed to
prevent "harmful or noxious uses" of property, no compensation is owed
under the Takings Clause, regardless of the regulation's effect on property
value.
26
The United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision and ruled that a regulation that deprives a
property owner of all "economically viable uses of his land" constitutes a
regulatory taking that requires just compensation. 7  This decision
energized a simmering private property rights28 debate that continues to
this day.29
22 id.
23 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, 1989
CP 10 #000066 <http://www3.charlestoncounty.org/connect/LUGROUP 1> (accessed
December 3, 2003).
24 The court noted that "[a]lthough the regulatory takings question is a complex one,
and although regulations affecting coastal property are especially problematic, this appeal
presents, in the end, what in our view is a relatively straightforward issue." Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896-898 (1991).
25 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
26 Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900.
27 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004.
28 We will not attempt to define "private property rights" here, but note that we agree
with the concept that "the definition of private property rights - and, as appropriate, the
redefinition of private property rights over time - must generally be left to democratically
elected representatives of the people rather than to the judiciary." Georgetown Envtl. L.
& Policy Inst., The Takings Issue, <http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/takings/
index.htm> (accessed Jan. 13, 2004).
29 The private property rights movement has many national organizations. See e.g.
American Land Rights Assn., <http://www.landrights.org> (accessed Jan. 13, 2004);
Coalition for Property Rights, Home Page <http:www.proprights.com>
(accessed Jan. 13, 2004); Defenders of Property Rights, Home Page
<http://www.yourpropertyrights.org> (accessed Jan. 13, 2004); Prop. Rights Cong. of
Am., Inc., Home Page, <http://www.freedom.org/prc> (accessed Jan. 13, 2004). For
general information on the property rights debate, see Georgetown Envtl. L. & Policy
Inst., supra n. 28.
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III. OUTCOMES OF THE LUCAS DECISION
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Lucas holding is its
lack of impact on general land use regulation. Following the decision,
some environmental advocates worried that local governments and state
agencies would forgo important regulatory initiatives for fear of having to
compensate a new class of property owners. 30 Property rights advocates
heralded Lucas, along with three other United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with takings - First Evangelical,31 Nollan,32 and Dolan33 - as
signaling a new era in the battle against regulation. 34 Justice Blackmun, in
his Lucas dissent, had warned of the potential for misinterpretation:
The Court makes sweeping and in my view, misguided and
unsupported changes in our takings doctrine. While it
limits these changes to the most narrow .subset of
government regulation - those that eliminate all economic
value from land - these changes go far beyond what is
necessary to secure petitioner Lucas' private benefit. One
30 See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, The Coastal Guardian, 3.4
(newsletter of the S.C. Coastal Conservation League) 1-2 (July/Aug. 1992).
31 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). A church complained that a county flood control district
ordinance prohibiting construction on the church's property denied it the use of its
property. The Supreme Court ruled that when a government has taken property by a land
use regulation, the landowner may recover damages for the period before it is finally
determined that the regulation constitutes a taking of property.
32 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The California Coastal
Commission imposed a condition to a rebuilding permit requiring owners to provide.
lateral public beach access to cross private property. The Supreme Court ruled that
Commission could not, without paying just compensation, impose, as a condition on a
rebuilding permit, that property owners transfer to the public an easement across
beachfront property.
33 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The city imposed a condition on a
building permit requiring a landowner to dedicate a portion of her land lying within a
flood plain for improvement of storm drainage and land adjacent to floodplain be
dedicated for a bicycle and pedestrian pathway. The Supreme Court held that the city's
dedication requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of property.
34 Nancy G. Marzulla, Land Rights: The 1990's Property Rights Rebellion, 15 (Bruce
Yandle ed., Rowman and Littlefield 1995).
Fall 2003 ]
8 SOUTHEASTERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [ Vol. 12.1
hopes they do not go beyond the narrow confines the Court
assigns them to today.
35
The actual lack of collateral damage from Lucas is due, we
believe, to the generally high quality of commentary following the release
of the decision 6 and the fact-specific nature of takings jurisprudence, as
demonstrated by subsequent cases.37 Observers agreed with the dissent's
description of Lucas-type instances as "relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial
uses." 38 Such an analysis seems to have filtered rapidly to local planning
departments, state agencies, and subsequent court decisions. 39 Although
there undoubtedly have been misinterpretations of Lucas,4 ° on balance the
decision and its counterparts provided additional clarity on the permissible
boundaries of regulation.4'
Subsequent United States Supreme Court holdings in the takings
arena have not resulted in broad expansion of the protection afforded
property owners. In the 2002 Lake Tahoe42 decision, for example, the
Court sustained local development moratoria on grounds that protecting
critical environmental resources is a proper exercise of the golice power of
the state.43  Likewise, in the 2001 Palazzolo decision, a landowner
invested in property containing salt marshes designated by the local
35 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36 See supra n. 7.
37 The U. S. Supreme Court acknowledges that its regulatory takings jurisprudence is
characterized by "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124,
designed to allow "careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances,"
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For an
interesting discussion of the Lucas case in the energy law context, see Paul Turner & Sam
Kalen, Takings and Beyond: Implications For Regulation, 19 Energy L.J. 25 (1998).38 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. (Emphasis added).
39 A LEXIS Shepard's search on Jan. 29, 2004 shows that the 1992 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, has been cited close to 2,800 times.
40 Interview with Chris Brooks, Deputy Director, S.C. DHEC Office of Coastal
Resources Management (OCRM), and Deborah Hernandez, Engineer, S.C.
DHEC/OCRM. Hernandez stated that not allowing a landowner to build a bridge across
public trust marsh could be a taking. (1999).
41 See supra n. 38.
42 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002).
41 Id. at 343.
44 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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regulatory agency as protected coastal wetlands.45 When repeatedly
denied permission to fill the wetlands, the landowner filed a takings
action, which the state court rejected.46 The Supreme Court affirmed in
part, holding the state court correct in finding that the landowner failed to
establish a deprivation of all economic value when the upland portion of
the parcel retained significant worth for construction of a residence.47 The
case was remanded 48 so the claims could be examined under a more
traditional takings analysis set forth in the 1978 Penn Central case.
49
Twelve years after Lucas, therefore, governmental bodies can proceed
with regulation with an elevated, although by no means clear,
understanding of its constitutional limits. In light of these recent cases,
maybe other aspects and outcomes of the Lucas case'- and the property
involved in that case - deserve more attention.
IV. ECONOMIC AND GEOLOGIC CONTEXTS OF LUCAS
Perhaps the most important lessons from Lucas for this century
have less to do with its legal implications than with the economic and
geological context that gave rise to the case. Understanding this context is
critical for policy makers confronting beachfront and land use challenges
in the coming decades.
Beaches along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts always have been
unstable, dynamic places.51 South Carolina's barrier islands are virtual
geological infants, having been formed only 10,000 or so years ago.
52
45 d. at 611.46 Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (2000).
47 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
48 id.
49 The test set forth by this case involved a conclusion that "the application of New
York City's Landmarks Law has not effected a 'taking' of appellants' property. The
restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and
not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants
opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other
properties." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
50 See U. S. Govt. Acct. Off., Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Executive
Order on Government Actions Affecting Private Property <http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d031015.pdf> (accessed Jan. 13, 2004).
51 See Orrin Pilkey, A Celebration of the World's Barrier Islands 38-88 (Columbia
U. Press, 2003).
52 Gered Lennon, William J. Neal, David M. Bush, Orrin H. Pilkey, Matthew Stutz,
& Jane Bullock, Living With the South Carolina Coast 15-16 (Duke U. Press, 1996).
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Erosion and accretion are facts of life in these areas. 53 However, two
additional factors have converged to create a fiscal and political powder
keg. First, intense and extensive development of coastal barrier islands
has exploded in the past three decades. 54 The investment of billions of
dollars of private and public capital to develop these areas is historically
unprecedented.55 Further, the pace of development and redevelopment in
these areas does not appear to be slowing. 6 The second factor is risingsea levels associated with global warming. 57
A. Development on the Isle of Palms
In 1968, Congress established the National Flood Insurance
58Program, which provides flood insurance coverage in areas where
private insurance either was not available or was extremely expensive. 59 It
seems no coincidence that five years later, in 1973, a group of investors
formed the Isle of Palms Beach and Racquet Club and purchased 1,537
acres on the eastern end of the Isle of Palms for $638,000, or $1,649 per
acre.
60
53 See Pa. St. U., Georgia-South Carolina Coastal Erosion Study Bibliography, Pt. 1
<http://www.personal.psu.edu/users/i/m/imhI 13/geoscience/Biblio I 11 .pdf> (accessed
Jan. 21, 2004) (a list of many studies demonstrating S.C.'s coastal erosion and accretion).
54 Jeffrey S. Allen, Kang Shou Lu, & Thomas D. Potts., A GIS-Based Analysis and
Prediction of Parcel Land Use Change In a Coastal Tourism Destination Area (World
Congress on Coastal & Marine Tourism, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, 1999)
<http://www.strom.clemson.edu/publications/coastal/cmt.pdf> (accessed Dec. 1, 2003).
" See Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance
Program: Fiscal Year 2002 Statistics by State <http://www.fema.gov/nfip/fy02st.shtm>
(accessed Dec. 1, 2003).56 Id.
57 For a list of studies on sea level rise associated with global warming, see U.S.
EPA, Global Warming Publications, Sea Level Rise Reports, <http://yosemite.epa.gov/
oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ResourceCenterPublicationsSeaLevelRiselndex.html>
(accessed Jan. 30, 2004).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4011 - 4029 (2003).
59 For more about the federal flood insurance program, see Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Flood Insurance, <http://www.fema.gov/nfip> (accessed Jan. 30,
2004).
60 Charleston County Property Records, < http://www.taxweb.charlestoncounty.org>
(accessed Jan. 30, 2004)
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Shortly thereafter, the Isle of Palms Beach and Racquet Club
began the development of Wild Dunes,61 building a golf course, marina,
clubhouse, roads, and sewer and water lines. Over the coming decade,
local property prices escalated dramatically. In 1979, lot 22, one of the
lots at issue in the Lucas case, sold for $96,660.62 This lot resold in 1984
for $200,000, resold again in 1985 for $260,000, and was purchased by
David Lucas in 1986 for $475,000. 6' Lucas also purchased lot 24 for
$500,000 in the same year.
64
What is particularly striking about these price increases is the fact
that these ever-increasing-in-value lots are on an especially unstable part
of the Isle of Palms. 65  In light of this instability, the Beachfront
Management Act66 even designated this area as an "inlet erosion zone"
67
in 1988. The Act established a "baseline" where the high tide line reached
68its landward most point over a 40-year period. In other words,
everything seaward of the baseline had been under water for at least one
extended period between 1948 and 1988. Both of Lucas' lots were located
in this dynamic area.
69
B. Sea Level Rise and Global Warming
Sea level is predicted to rise over this century from one to three
feet.70 In South Carolina, this rise will translate into a minimum of 200
61 For more information about the Wild Dunes Resort today, see
<http://www.wilddunes.com/> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004).




65 David Bush, Orrin H. Pilkey Jr. & William J. Neal, Living by the Rules of the Sea,
19-40 (Duke U. Press, 1996).
66 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-10 - 48-39-360 (Supp. 2002).
67 S.C. Code Ann. § 30-1(D)(26) (2002) (A segment of shoreline along or adjacent to
tidal inlets which is directly influenced by the inlet and its associated shoals).
68 S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Supp. 2002).
69 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
70 Stephen P. Leatherman, Modeling Shore Response to Sea Level Rise on
Sedimentary Coasts, 14 Progress in Physical Geography 447, 447-464 (1991). See also
Bruce C. Douglas, Global Sea Level Change: Determination and Interpretation
<http://www.agu.org/revgeophys/douglaO1/dougla0l.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004);
James G. Titus & Vijay K. Narayanan, The Probability of Sea Level Rise
<http://www.gcrio.org/EPA/sealevel/seatitle.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004).
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feet of inland migration of the ocean, even absent local erosion trends.7'
As is true in other coastal regions, South Carolina structures collectively
worth billions of dollars now stand within this 200-foot zone. In the
absence of major policy reforms, the convergence of sea level rise, natural
erosion, and massive development along the beach, create a certain
prescription for economic and political disaster in South Carolina.
73
These revelations regarding the increasing danger faced by coastal
property due to global warming are fairly recent. In fact, the Lucas Court
noted that when Lucas purchased the lots in 1986, "no portion of the lots,
which were located approximately 300 feet from the beach, qualified as a
critical area under the 1977 [South Carolina Coastal Zone Management]
Act.",74 Accordingly, at the time, Lucas was not legally bound to obtain
permits in advance from the Coastal Council in order to develop his lots.
75
Yet extensive trial testimony meant the Court was aware of the erosional
history of the lots. 76 Furthermore, the Beachfront Management Act was
passed after an Environmental Protection Agency conference that
77discussed global warming and sea-rise.
Despite abundant evidence of the instability of this area and the
potential for property damage from storms and erosion, the Court ruled
against the state's effort to ban construction.7 8 Even in his dissent, Justice
Blackmun focused more heavily on procedural issues than on advancing a
substantive argument in defense of the Coastal Council's actions. 79 He
objected to the majority's assumption that the property had lost all value,
calling the state trial court's finding on that point "unreviewed (and
71Leatherman, supra n. 70.
72 See generally U.S. Geological Survey, South Carolina Assessment GIS Data
Compilation, <http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/nationalassessment/scarolina> (accessed Jan.
30, 2004).
73 See Lennon, supra n. 52 ( a compilation of perspectives about property ownership
on South Carolina's shore); Wallace Kaufman & Orrin H. Pilkey, Jr., The Beaches Are
Moving: The Drowning ofAmerica's Shoreline (Duke U. Press 1983).74 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1038.
77 Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote
More Efficient Regulation? <http://lic.law.ufl.edu/-page/been.pd /o20> (accessed Mar.
25, 2004).78Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032.
791Id. at 1041-1061.
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implausible)." 80 He went on to argue against the concept that eliminating
economic use constitutes a categorical taking, calling instead for a return
to the Court's unanimous approach in Agins v. Tiburon s8 where each
situation in which a taking is alleged "requires a weighing of public and
private interest." 82 Yet even Justice Blackmun did not follow that line of
reasoning to the conclusion that the specific state regulation in question,
South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act, was justified by the public
interest protected (or the public harm averted).83 One is left to wonder
whether, if the current science demonstrating sea level rise due to global
warming had been a part of the South Carolina General Assembly's
rationale for the Beachfront Management Act, the analysis would have
been different.
C. Epilogue: Implications of the Lucas Property's
Eventual Development
After modifying the test for a takings claim, 84 the United States
Supreme Court sent the Lucas case back to the South Carolina Supreme
Court to determine whether the Beachfront Management Act restrictions
could be justified under "background principles of nuisance and property
law." 85 Under this approach to the analysis, the State court did not find
80 Id. at 1036. Justice Blackmun also argued that the case was not ripe, because
Lucas could have applied for a special permit under the 1990 amendment to the 1988
Beachfront Management Act, asserting "the concern [over Lucas' ability to obtain relief
for a temporary taking] would have been more prudently expressed by vacating the
judgment below and remanding for further consideration in light of the 1990
amendments." Id. at 1045.
" 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (Land developers challenged a municipal zoning
ordinance restricting construction on a five-acre tract of unimproved land in a desirable
suburban area to five single-family residences. The plaintiffs had planned to construct an
apartment building on the lot. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
enactment of the ordinance constituted a taking of the property.)
8 2 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1049.
13 Id. at 1053.
Most scholars agree that the Supreme Court set forth a modified test in Lucas. See,
e.g., Robert Meltz, Dwight H. Merriam & Richard M. Frank, The Takings Issue:
Constitutional Limits on Land Use Control and Environmental Regulation, (Island Press
1999); Henry N. Butler, Regulatory Takings after Lucas, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regl6n3g.html> (accessed Jan. 20, 2004); David L. Callies, Takings: Land-
Development Conditions and Regulatory Takings After Dolan and Lucas (ABA 1996).
85 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
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this to be the case and directed the S.C. Coastal Council 86 to pay Lucas
$1,575,000 for the lots and legal fees, and take title to the lots.
87
Ironically, upon taking title to the Lucas property, the state agency
proceeded to enable the very action - that of development - which it had
spent years arguing was inappropriate. The agency sold both lots to a
private buyer for development. The buyer paid $360,000 for 11
Beachwood East and $425,000 for 13 Beachwood East." In 1996, that
buyer built a five- bedroom house of approximately 4,200 square feet on
the first lot. 90 The County's assessed value for this lot was $1,318,000.91
The second lot sold again in April 1999 for $650,000.92 In 2001, the new
buyer built a 3,200-square-foot, four-bedroom house, assessed at
$1,235,000. 93
In the final analysis, the government and taxpayers ended up
paying twice for the Lucas lots - first, by subsidizing flood insurance and
public funding of such activities as emergency sand scraping, and second,
by forced outright purchase of the lots at prices that were higher than they
would have been had the landowner shouldered all of the risk. Instead of
furthering the goals of the Coastal Zone Management Program,94 these
actions worked against the public interest and wasted tax dollars.
95
86 As part of a 1994 state government reorganization, the S.C. Coastal Council has
been replaced by the S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control's Office of Ocean & Coastal
Resource Mgmt. S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control, Coastal Management in South
Carolina, Fact Sheet, Coastal Program Time Line, <http://www.scdhec.net/eqc/ocrm/
IMAGES/CCF/FactSheet TimeLine.pdf> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004).
87 Lucas, 424 S.E.2d 484 (1992).
88 Charleston County Auditor, Charleston County Public Records ONLINE System
<http://prcweb. charlestoncounty.org> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004).
89 id.
90 Charleston County Online Tax System, Charleston County Online Tax System:
Real Property Detail <http://taxweb.charlestoncounty.org> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004).
91 Id.
92 See Charleston County Auditor, supra n. 88.
93 id.
94 S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control, OCRM Organization and Staff,
<http://www.scdhec.com/ocrm/HTML/org.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004) (The South
Carolina Ocean and Coastal Resource Management's home page states the primary goals
of the program "are to protect the quality of the coastal environment and to promote the
economic and social improvement of the coastal zone for the people of the state.").
95 See Town of Hilton Head Island, The Flood Hazard, <http://www.ci.hilton-head-
island.sc.us/Safety/floodhaz.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004) (Local governments are
forced to help their citizens manage the risks associated with coastal living.).
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Although the South Carolina coast has not been hit by another
major storm since Hurricane Hugo in 1989, 96 the beach in front of the two
Lucas lots experienced severe erosion in the early and mid-1990s. 97 A
significant amount of artificial manipulation has been necessary to protect
coastal property in the area. For example, immediately following Hugo,
extensive sand scraping98 was performed in the area, as was true on many
beaches in South Carolina.99 Between 1995 and 1997, several emergency
orders were issued to the Wild Dunes Community Association for sand
scraping. 00 In 1997, a lot owner applied for a permit to place 5-foot by
10-foot sand bags to protect oceanfront lots.' 0' After much public debate,
the S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) - the
parent agency of what was the S.C. Coastal Council and what is now the
Office of Ocean Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) 102 - denied the
permit, agreeing to allow the use of smaller sand bags instead.'0 3
In 2001, the Wild Dunes Community Association was issued a
beach scraping permit by OCRM to place a maximum of 25,000 cubic
96 See Natl. Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Natl. Weather Serv. Forecast Office,
<http://wchs.csc.noaa.gov/hugo.htm> (accessed Jan. 20, 2004) (contains a detailed
accounting of the path and destruction of Hurricane Hugo).
97 See Christopher P. Jones, Temporal Shoreline Changes and Trends Along South
Carolina Inlet Shorelines, Natil. Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Shoreline Change
Conference Proceedings, <http://www.csc.noaa.gov/shoreconf/session4.html#jones>
(accessed Jan. 20, 2004). See also Surfrider Foundation, South Carolina Beach Erosion
<http://beach.com/stateofthebeach/6-state/beacherosion.asp?state=SC> (accessed Jan.
20, 2004) ("2% of South Carolina's shoreline is critically eroding, according to the report
'State Coastal Program Effectiveness in Protecting Natural Beaches, Dunes, Bluffs, and
Rock Shores.' (T. Bernd-Cohen and M. Gordon), Coastal Management, 27:187-217,
1999.") For a discussion of erosion generally on South Carolina's shorelines, see Jeffrey
Pompe, The Nature of Sand: South Carolina's Shifting Shoreline, <http://www.cla.sc.edu/
poli/courses/scgov/Articles/Sand.htm> (accessed Jan. 20, 2004).
98 Sand scraping entails excavating near the low tide line and placing the material in
front of threatened houses and condominiums. It is considered part of beach
renourishment by the S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control. See S.C. Dept. of Health &
Envtl. Control, State of the Beaches 2001, <http://www.scdhec.net/eqc/ocrm/images/
sob30lv2.html> (accessed Jan. 20, 2004).
99 See Coastal Science & Engineering, Emergency Beach & Dune Restoration Along
S.C. 's Grand Strand Following Hurricane Hugo, <http://www.coastalscience.com/
acrobat/projectpapers/Hugo%20Web%20Page.pdf> (accessed Jan. 20, 2004).
1oo Interview with Bill Eiser, Geologist, S.C. DHEC, OCRM (2003).
'o0 S.C. DHEC/OCRM, Permit No. OCRM-97-189-H.
102 Coastal Mgt. In S.C., Fact Sheet, supra n. 89.
103 Interview with Bill Eiser, Geologist, OCRM (2003).
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yards of sand on the edge of eroding lots.'0 4 This permit was appealed; a
final decision has not yet been rendered.10 5 Nevertheless, on May 23,
2002, OCRM issued to the Wild Dunes Community Association another
emergency order for beach scraping. 10 6  This level of beachfront
manipulation in a period of relative calm is prophetic of the problems that
almost certainly will occur in the future. It does not, however, offer any
evidence that might cause the Court to rule differently today than it did in
1992.
In one sense, the Lucas case is straightforward. The state of South
Carolina passed a law that prohibited the construction of houses on two
beachfront lots.' 0 7  The U.S. Supreme Court, agreeing with the South
Carolina lower courts' analysis, decided that this prohibition had removed
all economic value from the two lots. 108 From earlier jurisprudence, 109 the
Court determined that the removal of all economic value constitutes a
taking, unless the state can show that the action was grounded in
"background principles of nuisance and property law." 110 On remand, the
South Carolina Supreme Court determined that was not the case and
ordered the S.C. Coastal Council to compensate Lucas. "'
Yet certain questions remain unresolved. If the lots were located
in such a hazardous location, why would a rational investor pay hundreds
of thousands of dollars for them? And why, eventually, did the owners
expend even more money to build large houses - houses that extensive
evidence" 12 suggested were likely to be damaged or destroyed over the
next few decades? Was the state overselling the risk, or was the string of
investors who drove the lot prices up at an annual rate of 20% misled
about what they were buying? Further, what role should the U.S. Supreme
'04 S.C. DHEC/OCRM, Permit No. OCRM-00-715-E (Feb. 8, 2001) (authorizing the
Wild Dunes Community Association to perform beach sand scraping under certain
conditions. No work has ever been done under this permit, which expires February 8,
2006. The permit states that the excavation zone will be on the intertidal beach to a depth
of 18", not to exceed 25,000 cubic yards per month.).
105 Interview with Bill Eiser, Geologist, S.C. DHEC/OCRM (2003).
106 Id.
'07 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (referring to the Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 48-39-250 et seq (Supp. 1990)).
io8 Id. at 1031.
109 See Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
0 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004.
"' Lucas, 424 S.E.2d at 486.
112 See supra nn. 73-79 and accompanying text.
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Court have, if any, in resolving what appear to be radically different
economic points of view? Answering these questions involves the
discussion of the origins of the constitutional protection of property
presented in the next section.
V. ABANDONING THE ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND DISTORTING OF THE TRUE
FREE MARKET AND REGULATORY PROCESSES
Over the past 200 years, the U. S. Supreme Court has adhered to
the proposition that the free market should be protected from interference
by the states." 3 Laissez-faire ' 14 capitalism is a cornerstone of American
prosperity, and the courts have been zealous defenders of that system. 115
During the drafting of the United States Constitution, South
Carolina's Charles Pinckney advocated constitutional limitations on the
states' power to impair contracts. 1 6 He argued this limitation was critical
to restore American credit, which was instrumental to national commerce
and prosperity:"17 "[n]o more shall paper money, no more shall tender
laws, drive their (European) commerce from our shores...", 18
Over the succeeding two centuries, judicial rulings on property
were imbedded with the notion that free trade was the foundation of
113 See Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (overturning a Washington statute that
prevented employment agencies from conducting business). See also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Oklahoma declared the making and selling of ice to be a
business affected with a public interest and required a certificate for entering the
business. In order to obtain such a certificate an applicant had to show "necessity" and
the inadequacy of existing facilities. The Court noted that the certificate provision was
clearly aimed to shut out new enterprises; thus creating a monopoly in existing ice
companies, and that it further unreasonably curtailed the right to engage in a lawful.
private business in violation of the due process clause. Id. at 279-280)
114 Laissez-faire is the governmental abstention from interfering in economic or
commercial affairs. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
115 See Laissez-Faire League, Laissez-Faire Primer, available at
<http://www.laissez-faire.org/lfprimer.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004). See also G.
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 431 (1993);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, And Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931 (1991).
116 James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History
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national prosperity. 119 In the early 2 0th century, the Court expressed its
commitment to laissez-faire capitalism in Lochner v. New York when it
overturned a New York law that restricted workers in bakeries to 10 hours
a day or 60 hours a week. 20 Constitutional historian James W. Ely, Jr.
explains that because the majority of the Supreme Court justices were
influenced by laissez-faire values, they remained leery of economic
regulations that altered free-market ordering or infringed on property
rights. 21 Justice Holmes took exception to these principles in his dissent
in the Lochner decision, squarely attacking the Court's use of the Fifth
Amendment to promote unfettered capitalism. He stated, "[t]his case is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain."' 122 Justice Holmes argued in favor of a state role in setting
working conditions, noting that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."' 23  Although subsequent
rulings retreated from Lochner and gave the state more latitude to enact
worker protection laws, 24 the basic principle remained that the
constitutional protection of property was central to a free and prosperous125
economy.
In this context, what distinguishes Lucas from virtually all prior
takings cases is the extent to which the property values and uses under
debate were not products of a truly free market. Instead, the
extraordinarily high lot prices emerged from substantial federal and state
market intervention, in the form of federal flood insurance subsidies 126 and
119 Id.
12 0 Lochner v. N.Y, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). (The Supreme Court overturned a New York
State law that limited the employment in bakeries to 60 hours a week and 10 hours a day.
The Court ruled that the New York law could not be sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power to protect the public health, safety, and general welfare.).
121 Ely, supra n. 116, at 120.
122 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
123 Id. See Herbert Spencer, On Social Evolution, 38-52 (U. Chicago Press 1972).
124 See West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (refusing to invalidate a
Washington minimum wage law for women, noting that this class has been exploited and
the community law-making power may correct this abuse), Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908)(ruling that an Oregon law limiting the amount of hours women could work in
a laundry did not infringe upon the 14th Amendment, and that had this law applied to
men, it would have been invalid).
125 Ely, supra n. 116 at 101-18.
126 See U.S. EPA, supra n. 57.
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the South Carolina Wind and Hail Underwriting Association (the "wind
pool"). 127
Such subsidies make it possible to obtain insurance in areas that
the private sector had deemed too risky to insure. 128 The rapid increase in
lot prices that occurred in the 1970s reflects, in part, the transfer of risk
from the lot owner to the public. 129 Such a risk transfer benefits the owner
at the time of transfer, in this case the Beach Company, and not David
Lucas. 130 Once the risk transfer has been "internalized" in the price,
subsequent owners do not reap further benefits.
How then can the Lucas circumstances, in which value and use
emerge as a result of public subsidies distorting market forces, be
reconciled with the U.S. Supreme Court's long tradition of defending free-
market capitalism? There are two courses of inquiry the Court could have
pursued. The first entails analyzing the economic context that gave rise to
the case and factoring that into the decision regarding the consequences of
the limitations placed on property development by the Beachfront
Management Act. The second requires scrutiny of South Carolina's fiscal
policies, namely public subsidies, and how they radically contradict
government regulation.
A. Economic Context of Applying the Beachfront Management Act
127 See S.C. Wind & Hail Underwriting Assn., About Us, <http://www.scwhua.com/
about> (accessed Jan 19, 2004) ("In 1971, the South Carolina Legislature required the
insurance industry to make wind and hail insurance coverages available to home and
business owners in the coastal area. This action was necessary because some residents
and business owners were unable to obtain wind and hail coverages due to close
proximity to coastline.") The state's decision to mandate the extension of insurance to an
area that the industry had determined was unacceptably risky represents another market
distortion that has the effect of encouraging beachfront development.
128 Beth Millemann, Flood Insurance Unmasked, 25(2) Underwater Naturalist (Aug.
2000) 13-19. See generally Insurance Journal, South Carolina Property Policies
Dwindling (Dec. 6, 2001) available at <http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/
newswire/south/2001/12/06/15092.htm> (accessed Jan 30, 2004).
129 Id. It is important to note that Lucas, as the fourth property owner of the lots, did
not benefit directly from the subsidy. Because the flood insurance program and the wind
pool were enacted long before Lucas purchased his lots, in 1968 and 1971 respectively,
the price he paid reflected the risk transfers. In fact, of all of the individuals who owned
these two lots, Lucas' profit, in terms of annual appreciation, was the smallest.
130 Charleston County Tax Records, supra n. 60.
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Professor John Nolan discusses economics in his 1992 article,
Private Property Investment, Lucas and the Fairness Doctrine.'31 He
writes, "most lots in this area of disability [the high-risk area where
private insurance was not available] would not be developed but for the
availability of government sponsored insurance programs.", 32 He raises
the question of whether this risk is a limitation that "'inhere[s] in the title
[of the property] itself as the majority decision required not because of
common law nuisance limitations but due to local industry practices...
,133 In other words, does the determination that the property is too risky
to be covered by private insurance qualify as the limitation present in the
title that the Court asserted must exist to justify a total taking?
This is an intriguing inquiry, but the Court did not choose to follow
this path. They did not question the economic circumstances that gave
rise to the case. The dissent did point out that Hurricane Hugo in 1989
"caused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion in property damage"' 34
and that the lots in question had been sold frequently at rapidly escalating
prices before Lucas purchased them.'35 But beyond these issues, Justice
Blackmun entertains no further speculation on the economics of
beachfront development. Neither he nor the majority even mention the
National Flood Insurance Program' 36 or the state wind pool, 137 whicheffectively subsidizes building on high-risk properties. 38
B. When Public Subsidies Trump Public Regulatory Efforts
131 John R. Nolan, Private Property Investment, Lucas and the Fairness Doctrine, 10
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 43 (1992).
132 Id. at 55 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
133 Id. at 57.
D4 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1037. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 1039. ("The record does not indicate who purchased the lots prior to Lucas,
or why none of the purchasers held on to the lots and built on them..
136 See supra n. 58-59.
137 See supra n. 128-129.
138 It is worth noting that a few years ago the state of South Carolina evinced an
eagerness to increase coastal insurance opportunities for its residents. See S.C. Coastal
Property Ins. Forum, Nov. 29-31 2001, <https://www.doi.state.sc.us/Eng/Public/
PressReleases/ForumBooklet.pdfz> (accessed Jan. 30. 2004) ("On November 21, 2001,
the South Carolina Department of Insurance partnered with insurance agent associations
and insurer representatives to sponsor a Coastal Property Insurance Forum. The purpose
of the Forum was to bring to insurers attention the many positive opportunities for
conducting business in our friendly regulatory environment.").
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Because the web of public policies that affect property values is
extraordinarily complex, 139 it is not surprising that the Lucas Court simply
accepted the economic context rather than attempting to disentangle forces
that underlie private value and use decisions. In our society, property
prices are accepted at face value and reflect the conditions that prevail at
the time. "'
However, Lucas should be a warning to governments that
regulatory goals and fiscal programs must not diverge radically in purpose
and outcome. In the face of historically unprecedented rises in sea level
combined with continued coastal development over the next century,
federal flood insurance, state mandatory wind pools, publicly-funded
beach nourishment projects, and other programs that reduce or remove
risk from building in hazardous coastal areas should be reformed. This
fact is especially true when the state decides that discouraging
construction in certain areas is so detrimental as to warrant prohibiting it
by regulation.' 4' It is clearly the role of the legislative branch, not the
courts, to rationalize regulation with fiscal policy. 42  The Lucas case
illustrates the power of public subsidies to trump regulatory efforts. As
such, it underscores the urgent need to reform programs that pay
homeowners to build in our nation's most hazardous places. Such reforms
will likely start with concerned citizens understanding the economic and
environmental ramifications of subsidies for coastal development. 143 We
139 See supra nn. 58-83 and accompanying text.
140 Coastal property prices continue to rise. Retirement Living Information Center,
Home Prices Soar for Coastal Property, <http://www.retirementliving.con/
RLart243.htm> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004) ("While overall home-price appreciation
currently stands at 7%, prices along the coasts have posted double-digit growth. The
average sales price has surged 78% to $457,000 over the last three years in North
Carolina's Outer Banks, for instance; and prices have risen rapidly in San Diego, Cape
Cod, South Florida and South Carolina's Hilton Head as well.").
141 Often, instead of regulating, states attempt to inform citizens of the ramifications
of choices related to coastal living. See, e.g., S.C. Dept. of Health and Envtl. Control,
Coastal Management in South Carolina, Fact Sheet, The Changing Faces and Places of
Coastal South Carolina, <http://www.scdhec.net/eqc/ocm/IMAGES/CCF/
Fact%20Sheet%2OChanging%2OFaces.pdf> (accessed Jan. 30. 2004).
142 For an interesting discussion of the difficulties associated with takings
jurisprudence, see Marc R. Poirier, The Virtues of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine 24
Cardozo L. Rev. 93 (2002).
143 Susanne C. Moser, Union of Concerned Scientists, Community Response to
Coastal Erosion: Implications of Potential Policy Changes to the National Flood
Insurance Program Global, F-5, <http://www.heinzctr.org/Programs/SOCW/
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must go beyond shifting responsibilities to purchasers,' 44 and implement
sound state and federal policies that will reflect the true risk and costs
associated with coastal development.
Erosion Appendices/Appendix%20F%20-%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed Mar. 24, 2004)
("The community level thus is a crucial one for understanding management responses to
coastal erosion. It is the level at which all individual and higher-order efforts (regional,
state, and federal) ultimately intersect. It is the level at which governmental or permit-
requiring erosion response actions are implemented. As such, it is also the level at which
economic, political, legal, and social pressures to enforce or evade rules and regulations
stemming from any governmental level become most immediate and take on a personal
face. Any change in federal, state, or local shoreline development and protection policy
will affect these communities and the erosion management actions they take.").
14 S.C. Sea Grant Extension Program & S.C. DHEC, Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management, Q&A On Purchasing Coastal Real Estate in South Carolina,
<http://www.scdhec.com/ocrm/PUBS/qarealestate.pdf> (accessed Mar. 24, 2004)
("Most oceanfront property is vulnerable to natural forces such as storms and beach
erosion, which can pose threats to your prospective property and undercut its value. This
guide focuses on basic questions you should ask as a potential purchaser of coastal real
estate. Whether you are considering an undeveloped lot or an existing building, there are
critical issues you should examine before committing to purchase.").
